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I. Introduction
The rapid development of Islamic financial industry in Indonesia has taken the interests of 
various stakeholders that are keen to learn and benefit from the success story of this alternate 
financial development. Not only that Indonesia has a huge potential for the industry to upscale 
its size and outreach splurged by the huge number of Muslim population but also the unique 
characteristic of the industry’s development that distinct its story from another developmental 
story across the globe. First and foremost, the bottom-up process that the Indonesian Islamic 
financial industry entailed with suggests that the evolvement of the industry is filled with the 
aspiration and expectation of the periphery that driven both demand and supply of Islamic 
financial industry. This consequently creates a development in a natural and value-loaded 
form. Beside the development-from-the-down-under inimitability of the development of 
Islamic financial industry in Indonesia, the emergence and later development of the industry 
passed various stages that facilitated the process of coming into existence and nurturance of 
the industry and the market. The gradual leniency of the new order regime toward “Islamic” 
economic development in the early stage of the industry until the unleashing stage of the 
market and the economy through democratisation of Indonesian public sphere are among 
the factors enabling the progress and the achievement of the industry until recent years. 
These two distinct characteristics of the development story of Islamic financial industry in 
Indonesia appeal further interests, in particular, toward factors, process, and consequences of 
this development to the presence and emergence of the industry since the emergence of Mith 
Gamr, a social bank that existed in Egypt in 1960s.
The emergence of Islamic finance in Indonesia is inseparable from the call for alternate 
system of economy based on the values and norms of Islam in Indonesia. This movement 
is aspired by developmental failure of New Order period that was unable to deliver the 
promise, bringing social justice and equality into the stake. Thus, the post-modernity context 
is attached to Islamic economic movement in Indonesia as well as to the emergence of Islamic 
financial industry as the conditions and the setting surrounding the idea of Islamic economics 
as an alternative order of economy. In this paper, it is argued that Islamic economic movement 
in Indonesia is not solely a vocal attempt to bring “Islamic tradition of law” into the socio-
economic relation and sphere as Hefner (1996) suggested. Instead, Islamic economic 
movement in Indonesia is influenced by the hope to realise a just and equitable economic 
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system, which is more related to the maqasid or the goal of the shari’ah rather than the 
formalistic interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. This echoes with Siddiqui’s (1981) view 
that remain on the holistic view of Islamic values and norms, which not only cover the legality 
of every transactions and conduct but also to touch the consequential ground. Consequently, 
this follows the argument that the Qur’an does not directly state a particular economic system 
by default. It is the holistic nature of Islam as a religion of practices that entails the believers 
with set of behavioural norms that govern the everyday practices of Muslim, including in 
the economy. Therefore, it is important to view Islamic economic and financial movement 
in Indonesia through the lens of constructivist rather than structuralist. The phenomena of 
the emergence of Islamic economics and Islamic financial industry in Indonesia is a socially 
constructed product, where notions and aspirations were adopted into the social construction 
of economic reality that moves by the aspiration to achieve development through alternative 
mode of economic order and links to the political economy situation of the nation during the 
emergence and the development of institutions and practices of economics in according to the 
Islamic principles and tradition.
In constructing the understanding of the emergence and development of Islamic 
economics and Islamic financial industry, it is essential to trace the process of evolvement 
of the concept, institutions, and practices of developmental-oriented Islamic economics and 
finance. For this purpose, the development of Islamic economics and finance is categorised 
into two period of development: (i) the development during New Order period and (ii) the 
development post-New Order. This brake-down is based on the argument that there is a 
structural change undertaken in the environmental setting of Islamic economics and finance 
in Indonesia, resulting from the removal of authoritarianism and the birth of democratic 
arrangement. This structural change in the environmental setting of the nation inevitably 
requires the analysis of the emergence and development of Islamic economics and finance 
in Indonesia to count for the distinction between the two periods. In addition, the process 
of transition of power and its impact to the political economy setting of the nation will be 
touched upon to contextualise the shift in the environmental setting of Islamic economics and 
Islamic financial industry. In the end, some reflection will be brought up to essentialise the 
process of emergence and development of Islamic economics and Islamic financial industry 
and to project the future of the movement and the industry and the potential outcome of the 
current development track.
II. Islamic Economic Movement in Indonesia during New Order Period
The earliest public appearance of developmental-oriented Islamic economics and financial 
discourse in Indonesia can be traced as early as 1983s when the first National Conference on 
Islamic Economy was held at Universitas Islam Bandung or Islamic University of Bandung. 
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This conference has attracted interests of various figures to discuss and share thought on 
what the economy is ought to from the perspectives of Islam to embody the notion of social 
justice and equality in the heart of developmental concept. In the following year, the first 
institutional experiment on developmental-oriented Islamic economics and finance called 
Baitul Tamwil Teknosa was established in 1984 as a platform for the emerging Islamic 
economists and their supporters to translate their ideas and concept into practices. Through 
this experimental institution, the primer arrangement of profit-and-loss-sharing is formally 
introduced and applied to replace interest-based system of conventional finance. This would 
allow the institution to reach the unbankable group and the poor to open access of capital for 
this underprivileged and to bring the economy closer to the advocate of Islamic economics 
expectation, narrowing the gap between rich and poor and realising justice. Albeit the limited 
impact that this Baitul Tamwil made and the riddling governance problem that bring down the 
institution later on, the emergence of such experimental institution marks a social construction 
process of the so-called ‘Islamically-oriented’ developmental institution that fuelled with 
the applied interpretation of Islamic principles and customs in its operation. While the 
development of developmental-oriented Islamic micro institutions in Indonesia has began in 
the early 1980s, the emergence of medium size economic institution can only happen later in 
early 1990s with the establishment of Indonesia first Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat, in 1992. 
This development marks another hallmark of Islamisation of economic practices and financial 
institution where the concept reaches the central gravity of financial economy by transforming 
a conventional banking framework into an Islamic one. This entire process of emergence of 
Islamic economics and finance in Indonesia that begins with building public awareness over 
the concept up until converging the view of the centre toward Islamic alternative of financial 
framework suggests a story where it all begins from the sideline and moving along to the 
centre.
The rise of Islamic economic movement and Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia 
cannot be excluded from the context that set around the emergence of the construct in 
Indonesian setting. While such a movement is attached to similar call for the Islamisation of 
the economy that arouse around the world and marked by the establishment of Islamic banks 
across the Muslim world, the driving force that enables the creation of the institutions and 
the adoption of the practices in Indonesia is in absence from the indulgence of oil-income 
surplus that splurge Muslim countries with additional capital to boost the development 
of Islamic financial institutions. Even though the resources boom momentum reach and 
spur Indonesian economy, the New Order regime flipped its face from Islamic finance and 
favoured the conventional practices to manage resources for developmental purpose. The 
attachment of this alternate framework of finance to Islamic-oriented group caused the regime 
to adopt suspicious view over the call to assure that the regime identify and contained any 
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potential threat that any religious movement imposed into the unity of the nation (Choiruzzad, 
2013). Thus, the central power has very little interest in nurturing the development of Islamic 
economy and Islamic financial institutions by investing the capital from the conventional 
financial framework to Islamic alternative.
Instead of the top-down initiative that lead the emergence of Islamic economic practices 
and Islamic financial institution, the major driver of the movement to Islamise the economy 
and finance in Indonesia came from the periphery Muslim that constituted both the supply 
and demand of Islamic mode of financing and other Islamic economic construct. It is argued 
here that the bottom-up initiatives that lead the emergence and the development of Islamic 
economic movement is fuelled by Muslim activism, securing the opportunity to embed and 
institutionalise Islamic values and norms through institutions and practices. Muslim activism 
here is defined as a collective act that seeks to extent the private Muslim identity into a public 
domain, addressing various social issues, including economic one. Thus, this definition 
distinct Muslim activism from Islamism that often attached to “fundamentalism” with its 
negated connotation within the struggle of power. Albeit other attempts offering alternative 
definition of Islamism, such as the essentialist perspective (Dekmejian, 1985), constructivist 
perspective (Mandaville, 2007), or social movement theorist (Gole, 2000) provide promising 
and inclusive view, a differing definition is necessary here to distinguish between a sole 
socio-political action and a formation of religious character and mode of economic practices 
for society empowerment. Indeed, there are similarities between this definition of Muslim 
activism with Ismail (2006) definition of ‘Islamism’ as a product of interplay between history 
and presence challenge and situation. Nonetheless, this definition still entangles expression 
of piety with the struggle to acquire dominancy in the central of power or politics. In other 
words, the comprehensive view that this definition offered, by including politic into the 
analysis, often confuses the apolitical nature of socio-economic movement that initiated by 
Muslim in particular environment. For this purpose, the emphasise on the rise of Muslim 
activism in enabling factors of the emergence of Islamic economic and financial movement in 
Indonesia is brought forward.
2.1 The Rise of Muslim Activism
This rise of Muslim activism in Indonesia is made possible by the modernisation project 
that became the top priority of the New Order period. The transformation of the Indonesian 
economy from Agricultural-based economy into industrialised economy has boosted the 
contribution of manufacturing sector to total GDP from just under a tenth in 1966 to around 
20% in 1990 while reducing the dependency of the domestic economy to agriculture 
production from around half of the total GDP in 1966 to just above 20% in 1990 (Hill, 1994: 
84–86). As a result, income per capita rose on average of 4.5% per annum, allowing Indonesia 
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to enter the emerging middle-income countries group. With this strong development, the 
government was also able to run social welfare programme, among others are the provision of 
basic nine years education aiming to fight against heavy illiteracy rate (Jones, 1994) and the 
provision of health care services, especially in the attempt to improve early infants survival 
rate (Hull, 1994). In addition to that, the rapid economic development that the modernisation 
created produced a new social class, called the middle class. This class is considered as the 
inbetween group as it is nor a peasant nor a burgeoise. In a Marxist tradition, this social group 
is not formally recognised in the class system as it has no place, no role, and no direction 
in the social arena. Several other scholars attach middle class to a particular culture of 
profession, such as the white collar professional (Mills, 1951), entrepreneurs, commercial, 
and financial professionals (Hefner, 2000). This definition echoes Cambridge dictionary 
definition, where this group is described as 
“a social group that consist of well-educated people, such as doctors, lawyers, and 
teachers, who have good jobs and are neither very rich nor very poor” (dictionary.
cambridge.org).  
Thus, middle-class is mostly described as an emerging group that comprises of groups of 
intellectual with strong education background and professional job. 
During the New Order development period, the rise of middle-class in the urban area 
is among the highlighted transformation of Indonesian society. Dick (1985) argues that the 
domestic stability combined with the oil income surplus in 1970s has facilitated further 
consolidation of the middle-class during the New Order. In other words, the conducive 
environment and excess in capital during resource boom played role in accommodating the 
modernisation through industrialisation, enlarging the economy, allowing the provision of 
educations, creating more jobs and lifting standard of living of everyday Indonesians that 
formed the middle class. With the majority of the population subscribed to Islam, inevitably, 
the largest portion of this middle-class came from the Muslim background. Hence, the rise 
of Muslim middle-class dominates the story of middle-class consolidation in Indonesia. 
Like other middle-class groups, Muslim middle-class also comprises of professionals, civil 
servants, and intellectual (Wahid, 1990). The general characteristic of Muslim middle-class, 
which also applies to other middle-class, is its mode of consumption. The ability of middle-
class to consume cannot be undermined and, for Muslim middle-class, this ability has been 
utilised beyond consumptive pattern. Dick (1990) links the mode of consumption of the 
middle class with cultural and political representation and aspiration of this class. In a similar 
way, Muslim middle class also make use of its bargaining power to consume to demand for 
not only a product that meet their expectation but also a product that suit their lifestyle. 
This links to another characteristic of Muslim middle-class, which is its identity search 
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(Hefner, 2000; Wiktorowitz, 2002; Bayat, 2007; Pepinsky, 2013; Hassan, 2014). While 
Middle-class problem sit around the issue of defining their place, role, and direction in social 
sphere, Muslim middle-class faces a deeper challenge in establishing the living presence 
of Islam in the era of modernisation and globalisation (Pepinsky, 2013). The increasing 
importance of Islamic symbol in middle-class Muslim consumerist platform in Muslim world 
offers an early sign of the identity creation process of middle class Muslim in social sphere 
through social activism of the Muslim (Abaza, 2004; Hasan, 2014). Other experimental act 
on creating distinctive identity through religious attachment recorded in South East Asia 
with Baju Kurung and Mini Telekung for religious costume (Hasan, 2014) and contemporary 
Muslim women trend of veil (Fischer, 2008) give another indication that the rising Middle 
class has been active in the establishment of Islamic identity. The same experiences that exist 
in Indonesia suggest that, beyond enabling the demand for a differing products, services, 
and environment that represent religious expression, Muslim middle-class develop their 
own interpretation and expression of religious presence. The combination of both demand 
and supply of Islamic version of everyday behaviours, customs, and institutions is what 
constituted Muslim activism.
The emergence of Islamic economic movement in Indonesia is also a product of the rise 
of Muslim activism. The founding fathers of this developmental-oriented movement, among 
others A.M Saefuddin, Dawam Raharjo, and Amin Aziz, came from intellectual professional 
background of Pusat Pengembangan Agribisnis (Centre of Agribusiness development), Bogor 
Agricultural Institute (Choiruzzad, 2013). While the earliest public discussion on Islamic 
economics appears to be on the first National Conference on Islamic economics in Bandung, 
the movement earns attention from the religious council following the open discussion in the 
forum of Development Indonesia. Besides converging the stakeholders to incline toward the 
movement through open discussion, the movement also utilised other mean of converging 
the stakeholders perception over Islamic economics advocating through an emerging and 
established institution. For this purpose, ICMI or the intellectual Muslim Association of 
Indonesia has been turned as a vehicle for the movement to raise its influence and to gain 
support from other stakeholders. This approach turned out to be successful as the coalition 
building with various stakeholders, such as the religious council, has allowed the movement to 
earn legitimacy and later to induce the regime to accommodate the interests of the movement 
(Choiruzzad, 2012; Choiruzzad and Nugroho, 2013). This various modes of approach that the 
activists of Islamic economic movement adopted in the process of emergence and convergence 
of the stakeholders perception and views toward Islamic economic movement suggests that 
Muslim activism has play important role in enabling the movement to rise and evolve further 
beyond the passive influence of the growing middle-class effect in the development of the 
movement.
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2.2 First Wave of Change in Environmental Setting
While the rise of Muslim activism has acted as the active advocate of the movement, the 
advocacy would not deliver result without an enabling environmental setting. The New 
Order government is considered a repressive developmentalist regime (Raharjo, 1981), 
where policy is centralised around the close circle of the regime and access to opportunity is 
distributed amont the close-coalition through patronage networks (Robinson, 1988: 56). Thus, 
the space for development is limited and controlled by the inclination of the central power 
toward activities or movement. In particular, Suharto’s regime maintained antagonist stance 
against ‘Islamic’ force post-transition of the regime into power. Yunanto et al (2003; cited in 
Choiruzzad, 2013) asserted that this was sourced from the regime approach in maintaining 
domestic political stability, which is achieved through removing potential oppositional threat 
that can rose from either the far-left or the far-right movement. Consequently, the religious 
activism that mostly came from Muslim group was contained to very limited spaces and such 
strategy became successful in taming potential activism from the Muslim group. Nevertheless, 
the idea of Islamic economy was treated differently from other political and Islamic activism. 
Choiruzzad (2013) argued that the momentum of emergence of Islamic economic movement 
with its tailored proposal of mode of achieving development and prosperity matched with 
the Muslim society and Muslim activism needs, which is the revitalisation of interpretation, 
expression, and articulation of Islam beyond political sphere. In other words, the appeal 
of the movement that seeks for the accommodation of alternative modernisation approach 
derived from Islamic sources coincide with the trend of redefining and re-conceptualising the 
presence of Islamic values and norms in everyday practices, including in the economic field. 
This exposes a characteristic of Islamic economic movement in Indonesia that emphasise 
the search of identity in its formation beyond the story that has been built around similar 
movement across the globe that linked to the failure of state-ideological formation and 
modernisation project in 1960s in the Muslim world, Islamic revivalism across the Muslim 
world that began in 1970s, or oil-income surplus that finance the development of the Industry 
in 1970s.
The Indonesian story that started in early 1980s was often associated with the Islamic 
revivalism that spread in Indonesia from the late 1970s. Indeed, it emerges from the spirit to 
re-enact and institutionalise the customs and the traditions of Islam in both private and public 
sphere that inspired the rise of Islamic symbol and its form in everyday practices in the Arab 
world and South Asia. Yet, as the process of emergence of Islamic economics in Indonesia 
depicts a construction process, where various interests are aligned in natural and negotiated 
manner, Muslim activism term is emphasised to express the created condition that is apolitical 
in nature and civil society based. This unique features embedded within the term would help 
to read the shifting political economy of spaces during that time. The rise of Muslim activism 
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that drives the development of Islamic economics and its institutions coincidently occurred 
during the period where the coalition of the New Order faced a test of solidarity. The military, 
which has been Suharto’s closest ally and aid since its rise into power, encounter internal 
friction between factions within the military as well as growing dissatisfaction to Suharto’s 
leniency toward his children’s involvement in state project. This struck the balance of the 
coalition that has maintained internal stability of the country. While the New Order coalition 
loses its point of sustenance, the emergence of middle-class with its activism has pushed for 
the demand of spaces for civil society to develop. This opportunity was also explored by the 
active middle-class of the Muslim group to gain spaces for the expression and articulation 
of religious identity in the public space. The apolitical nature of the activism in social sphere 
allowed this emerging group to grow in absence from latent contestation of the regime and 
marked a shift in the attitude of the regime toward the activism of the Muslim groups carrying 
the vision and principle of Islam.
Islamic economic movement in Indonesia benefited from this change in the 
environmental setting as the shift in the attitude of the centre toward Islamic force has 
facilitated progress on the adoption of Islamic economic framework and the establishment 
of Islamic financial institution. The first sign of the regime inclination toward the movement 
was Suharto’s involvement in obtaining capital for the establishment of the first Islamic 
bank in Indonesia in 1991 (Choiruzzad, 2013). The supporting gesture of Suharto’s toward 
the establishment of this value-loaded bank is captured by the central bank and translated 
into a formation of a special task force responsible for the creation of this bank. After one 
year, the first Islamic bank in Indonesia names as Bank Muamalat Indonesia was founded, 
followed by an enactment of Act No. 7/ 1992 that served as the foundational law on the 
operation of Islamic bank. Another progress of the Islamic economy recorded two years and 
five years after the establishment of the first Islamic bank with the establishment of first 
Islamic insurance, PT. Syarikat Takaful and the establishment of first Islamic mutual fund 
respectively. Beside the convergence of the centre to join force in Islamising the economy 
through institutional built-up, the civil society role in developing Islamic economy in 
Indonesia continued to be strong, marked by the rapid development of Indonesian authentic 
version of Islamic developmental institution, Baitul Maal Wa Tamwil or often shortened as 
BMT. Albeit the oddness of its presence due to the absence of a proper regulatory umbrella, 
this institution has emerged and mushroomed across Indonesia with an estimated presence of 
above 2,000 BMTs operating in 1997. With all these achievement, it can be concluded that 
this change in the environmental setting has aided the institutionalisation of Islamic economic 
movement through an established formal institutions it formed.
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III. Islamic Economic Movement in Indonesia Post-New Order
Islamic economic movement post-Suharto entered a new stage of development. The steady 
development of the industry and practices during the New Order era was transposed into a 
swift and promising development, highlighted from several key progresses that the movement 
recorded. In the beginning of post-transition period, several acts and regulations issued to 
facilitate the expansion of Islamic financial industry. There are three majors acts enacted 
to enhance the growth of the industry, complementing one act that was issued in 1992 to 
recognise the profit-loss sharing arrangement. The active involvement of the Central Bank 
through issuance of acts and regulations on key issues, such as monetary arrangement, 
asset valuation, money market, and short-term deposit for Islamic financial industry has 
also provided the market with necessary regulatory framework to advance further. The 
contribution of the religious council through the issuance of Fatwas also assured that 
the progress of the industry was backed by shari’ah legitimacy. Since then, the industry 
boomed and led the establishment of 12 commercial banks, 24 Islamic windows, 48 Islamic 
insurances, and 48 Islamic refinancing companies in 2013, from about 1 Islamic bank, and 
two Islamic insurances operating until 1998 (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2014). In term of asset, 
the Islamic banking sector gained the most by booking Rp. 250.55 trillion in assets in 2014, 
indicating a sharp increase from only about Rp. 500 billion of assets in 1998 and enlarging the 
market share of the industry to a 5% level. Besides this progress in the mainstream Islamic 
financial sectors, the peripheral Islamic financial institutions also recorded a drastic increase. 
The Islamic rural banks or known as BPRS increased by more than double from 70 BPRS in 
1998 to 163 BPRS in 2013 and upsized of their assets from around Rp. 500 billion to Rp. 4.8 
Trillion (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2014). The Indonesian peripheral Islamic financing house 
or Baitul Maal wa Tamwil (BMT) even recorded a dire increase by almost triple from around 
2000 BMTs in 1998 to around 5,500 BMTs in 2013, mounting the asset under management 
from around Rp. 80 billion in 1998 to around Rp. 15 Trillion in 2013. This steeper growth 
of the expansion of Islamic financial institutions and Islamic economic practices suggests 
that there is a determining change that allowed the Islamic economic movement to push their 
agenda further since the transition period to democratic government.
3.1 Second Wave of Change in the Environmental Setting 
The dual crisis has been associated with the fall of the New Order regime under Suharto’s 
leadership. The combined economic and political crises were considered as the main reason 
behind the removal of Suharto and the subsequent reform that took place in the country. The 
story started, when the foreign exchange turmoil that initially blasted in Thailand, ultimately 
arrived in Indonesia in the late 1997. Since then, the Indonesian rupiah depreciated from 
Rp. 2,000 per US Dollar in the mid 1997 to around Rp. 15,000 per US Dollar a year later. 
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This caused the unhedged debt of the private sector to skyrocket, leading to a rising cost of 
production. This inevitably increases the costs of goods and pushed the inflation rate to an 
uncontrollable level. While the economy faced serious threat, the created uncertainty sparked 
masses-protest over the New Order repressive, centralistic, and corrupt management. The 
worsening economic condition in the development turned the protest into active grievances. 
When the everyday people subsistence was under threat due to the unfavourable inflation rate 
and the social inequality was subjugated, people began to express their frustration and anger 
in the street. The grievance began to spread all over Indonesia with the university student 
leading in the central stage of the protest, demanding Suharto to step down from his position. 
In May 1998, Suharto responded to this demand by quitting his position as the president after 
thirty-two years in power. Yet, the change did not stop there as series of reform was preceded 
following the fall of Suharto. This included amending the constitution, democratising 
Indonesian political and social environment, removing military political role, decentralising 
power and authority, reforming law enforcement system, and eradicating corruption, collusion, 
and nepotism or know as KKN practices in the government sectors (Hefner, 2000: 202–204; 
Aspinal, 2004). Therefore, the end of Suharto was the beginning of a serious transformation.
Emmerson (1990) and Hadiz (1999) were assured that the lack of democratic 
arrangement that Suharto maintained during his tenure pushed Suharto out of his chair. While 
the lack of inclusive and representative framework of negotiation and decision-making has 
been regarded as the driver of Suharto’s outcast, the corruption, collusion, and nepotism 
culture of the government producing a weak state institution was also pinpointed as a major 
cause of the collapse of the New Order regime. Albeit the dissimilar take-up that each 
arguments departed from, both arguments shared the same view that it is the repressiveness 
of the regime (Raharjo, 1981) and the patronship-setting of the distribution of opportunity 
(Robinson, 1988: 56) that came along with the causes of his fall. This was well-depicted by the 
demand to democratise Indonesian political and social environment, which was expected to 
adjust the political economy of the nation. As anticipated, democratisation of Indonesian socio-
politico sphere transformed the negotiation setting to be more inclusive and representative, 
widening the opportunity spaces and opening the gate for market-based competition.
The trajectory of Indonesian political economy setting inexorably affected the expansion 
of Islamic economic movement. The rapid growth of the developmental-oriented Islamic 
financial institution after the fall of Suharto was not coincided with the democratisation 
of Indonesia itself. Instead, the rapid growth was a sign of the promising future of Islamic 
economic movement in Indonesia in the era of democratic Indonesia. Alongside the rapid 
expansion of the industry, the society witnessed the emergence of Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs) commitly involved in the penetration of Islamic economic concept 
and practices in the public sphere. These organisations dedicated to the movement, among 
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others Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah or Shariah Economic Community, Pusat Komunikasi 
Ekonomi Syariah or Centre of Communication of Shari’ah Economy, student-led Forum 
of Islamic Economic Study or Fossei, or Association of Islamic financial institutions, such 
as ASBISINDO, BMT Centre, and PIN BUK, have involved in the infiltration process of 
Islamic economics concept and practices by advocating the society, representing the interests 
of stakeholders, and negotiating further extension of the industry and the market. While these 
organisations initially emerged and engaged through different means, the movement finally 
formalised an organised movement under the platform Gerakan Ekonomi Syariah (GRES) 
in 2013, which literal meaning is Shari’ah Economic Movement. The enactment of this 
organised movement hallmarked the beginning of integrated Islamic economic movement, 
where communication and coordination issue will be facilitated through this institution.   
The Democratisation of Indonesia socio-politico and socio-economico arena is argued 
here to impose a change to the environmental setting of Islamic economic movement, from 
regime-supportive setting with its created development likewise the case of Sudan and Kuwait 
(Kahf, 2004; Stiansen, 2004; and Smith, 2004) to a free contested market with extended and 
market-based development likewise the case of Jordan and Turkey (Baskan, 2004; Malley, 
2004), representing the second wave of change of the environmental setting that enable 
Islamic economy and the expansion of Islamic financial industry to go further. Beside the 
source of change that led the second wave of change of the environmental setting, the impact 
that this change carried forward was on another scale from the first wave of change of the 
environmental setting. The second wave of change of environmental setting of Islamic 
economic movement in Indonesia reform the negotiation setting as well as the distribution of 
space, which was untouched in the first wave of change. The reform took place in Indonesia 
since the end of the New Order decentralised the centralistic order of command, allowing 
the negotiation process to be settled in autonomous and open manner. Thus, the patronship 
characteristic that determined distribution of spaces and opportunity for thirty two years no 
longer sustained and later replaced by an open-market style.  
Table 1. The Emergence and Development Track of Islamic Economic Movement in Indonesia 
under Different Political Economy Setting
Period Political Economy Setting Indicators of the emergence of Islamic 
economics and finance 
Pre-Establishment of Islamic 
bank (1983-1992)
Unfavourable Regime setting The emergence of Islamic cooperatives 
and developmental-oriented Islamic 
economists
Post-Establishment until 1998 
(1992-1998) 
Regime-supportive setting The establishment of  f irst  Is lamic 
Bank; The introduction of the first act 
facilitating the operation of the bank 
Post-1998 Free contested market Increasing civil society involvement in 
the movement; Further consolidation 
leading to strong and healty development
Sources: Author
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The experience that Indonesia Islamic economic movement has gone through since 
its emergence is well-represented in the table 1 above. In the beginning, Islamic economic 
movement in Indonesia with its developmental orientation emerged from the periphery 
through various means, including through experimental action. The movement managed to 
foster the development of the institutions and practices within the unfavourable environmental 
setting that set the tone of political economy. Even, the movement was successful in 
converging the regime view to understand the empowerment nature of the movement. The 
active involvement of Suharto and his aid to the establishment and the financing of the first 
Indonesia Islamic bank and the enactment of law recognising profit-loss sharing contract 
could be considered as the turning point of the first wave of environmental change. Since then, 
other progress was made possible given the blessing of the regime. This situation drastically 
changed in the removal of Suharto and the transition toward democracy. The reform exercised 
has reformulated the negotiation setting of the political economy, creating what Yavuz (2004) 
called as opportunity spaces or a platform facilitating activism and exploration of “meaning, 
identity, and cultural codes”. This swift change marked another hallmark of the Islamic 
economic movement, where the second wave of change of environmental setting took place 
and boosted the project of the movement.
IV. Reflection
The progress that Indonesia Islamic economic movement achieved is attributed to the activism 
of peripheral Muslim, which not only demanding for accommodative means and tools for 
conducting economic and financial activities but also creating the platform for this alternative 
economic view. This unique quality of the movement, complemented by the unexpected 
reorganisation of environmental setting of the political economy of the nation, has enabled the 
movement to pierce into the heart of economic and financial practices by proposing a differing 
practical and institutional construct. Developmental-oriented Islamic financial institutions and 
Islamic economic practices have increased their role in the coordination and distribution of 
resources and opportunity, acquiring legitimacy and support to co-exist with the conventional 
institutions and practices. With the expanding influence of the construct, the movement 
encounter heavier challenges associated with the development track of the movement.
The dialectic friction between financial market development and peripheral development 
arouse alongside the rapid development of the institutions and practices is expected to 
be the most significant challenge of the development of Islamic economics and finance 
in Indonesia. The increasing interest in developing Islamic financial market has inspired 
several actors to invest capital and effort into the project. This commitment has provided 
Market-oriented Islamic financial institutions with support to exceed the development rate of 
conventional practices. The major focus to this mimic of modern conventional economic and 
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financial construct inevitably drew question on the purpose of such development, whether 
it is an attempt to capitalising Islam for resource accumulation or a foreword of Islamizing 
capitalism through re-engineering economic and financial product using traditional contract 
existed in the medieval Muslim society era. Either of this purpose signifies the allegation that 
perhaps Islam has not been capitalised as a third way to not only achieving economic and 
financial modernity but also to reallocate resources for more inclusive economic and financial 
engagement.
Albeit the potential problem that tickled the trajectory of the movement, the future 
prospect of Islamic economic and financial construct is still promising. The growth and 
development of Islamic economics and finance will remain strong, indicated by the increasing 
size, assets, and public awareness. Under the same condition, macro and meso-economic 
and financial institutions are gained the most, compared to micro-institutions like BMT, in 
the expansion of Islamic economics and finance. Consequently, inclusive, just, and equitable 
economy aspiration of the periphery will be faced by the reality that the focus of movement is 
gradually shifted toward economic and financial modernity, moving the capital to the Islamic-
version of capitalism and maintaining the neo-classical order of the economy.
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